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THE CHURCH AND MAGNA CARTA

R.H. Helmholz*

INTRODUCTION
This Article describes the role the English Church played in the enforcement of
Magna Carta. It does not enter into the vexed question of the Great Charter’s sources.1
Nor will it take up the possibility raised by the scholarship of the late John Baldwin:
that Archbishop Stephen Langton, a product of the Paris Schools, played a major
part in the Charter’s formulation, importing ideas drawn from the learning of the
schools into its provisions.2 It also excludes coverage of the Charter’s relation with
individual religious freedom in the sense we know it today.3 These are important but
different subjects. This Article deals instead about the clergy’s reaction to and subsequent use of the Charter, the document as it existed in 1215,4 as it was amended
in 1225,5 and as it was often reaffirmed by King and Parliament in later years.6

* Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1
My conclusions on this subject are found in R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta and the ius
commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1999); see also Kenneth Pennington, The “ius commune”,
Suretyship and Magna Carta, 11 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI DIRITTO COMUNE 255 (2000).
They have not, however, been widely accepted. See, e.g., John Hudson, Magna Carta, the
ius commune, and English Common Law, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE ENGLAND OF KING
JOHN 99–117 (Janet S. Loengard ed., 2010).
2
John W. Baldwin, Master Stephen Langton, Future Archbishop of Canterbury: The
Paris Schools and Magna Carta, 123 ENG. HIST. REV. 811 (2008); see also David L.
d’Avray, “Magna Carta”: Its Background in Stephen Langton’s Academic Biblical Exegesis
and Its Episcopal Reception, in 38 STUDI MEDIEVALI, 423–38 (1997); Giles Mandelbrote,
King John and Magna Carta: New Discoveries from Lambeth Palace Library, LAMBETH
PALACE LIBR. ANN. REV. 46 (2015); Nicholas Vincent, Stephen Langton, Archbishop of
Canterbury, in ËTIENNE LANGTON, PRÉDICATUR, BIBLISTE, THÉOLOGIEN ÉTUDES RÉUNIES
51, 93–97 (Louis-Jacques Bataillon et al. eds., 2010). This conclusion has also not been
accepted by all scholars. See, e.g., David A. Carpenter, Archbishop Langton and Magna
Carta: His Contribution, His Doubts and His Hypocrisy, 126 ENG. HIST. REV. 1041 (2011).
3
See, e.g., Tore Lindholm, Magna Carta and Religious Freedom, in MAGNA CARTA
AND THE RULE OF LAW, 193–226 (Daniel B. Magraw et al. eds., 2014); Mary Ziegler, The
Conservative Magna Carta, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1653 (2016).
4
MAGNA CARTA (1215).
5
MAGNA CARTA (1225).
6
See FAITH THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA: ITS ROLE IN THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH
CONSTITUTION, 1300–1629, at 10 (1948) [hereinafter THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA] (noting
a total of thirty-seven confirmations by Edward III, Richard II, Henry IV, and Henry V).
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This subject has been touched, but only lightly, in the enormous amount of historical scholarship that has been devoted to Magna Carta.7 There is something to be
added to it, but it seems sensible to begin with a summary of what has already been
established in the large body of scholarly literature devoted to the subject. That summary can be brief. There are only two points related to the Article’s theme—the
church’s place in the Charter’s provisions—that are relevant. First, the great bulk of
scholarly attention and analysis has been devoted to Clauses 18 and 63,9 which
promised that the English church should enjoy its liberties unimpaired. This is the
obvious place to start, and historians have looked unflinchingly at what the clauses
accomplished in practice—very little.10 Second, after the withdrawal of its annulment by Pope Innocent III in 1215, the English clergy enthusiastically supported the
Charter.11 This is certain. The bishops threatened with excommunication anyone,
except the King, who violated its provisions.12 Thus, it was not just the secular
barons who sought to secure its regular enforcement in the years after the events at
Runnymede. The leaders of the church embraced it—though again, it is thought,
without securing results that seem sufficient to have justified their enthusiasm.13
The first of these points begins with Clause 1 of the Charter and usually ends
there. This Clause was the centerpiece of longstanding efforts to secure the rights
claimed by the English clergy.14 Devoting special attention to this Clause seems
reasonable. Designed immediately to secure the English church’s freedom in the
choice of its own bishops and abbots,15 the Clause might have extended further. Its
wording certainly invited a fuller effect. However, the results of Clause 1 actually
turned out to be quite disappointing in practice. Its effectiveness was undercut in fact
by the power of kings and popes, who used the system of postulation and royal
consultation to make an end run around the electoral rights of the English clerical
7

An exception is A. Keith Thompson, The Liberties of the Church and the City of
London in Magna Carta, 18 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 271 (2016).
8
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 1, reprinted in DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 38–39
(2015) (translating Magna Carta 1215) (“[T]he English church is to be free, and is to have
its rights in whole and liberties unharmed . . . .”).
9
Id. at c. 63, at 68–69 (“Wherefore, we wish and firmly command that the English church
be free, and that the Men in our kingdom have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, rights and
concessions . . . .”).
10
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE
GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 191–94 (2d ed. Lawbook Exchange 2000) (1914).
11
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 422.
12
Id.
13
See d’Avray, supra note 2, at 432–34 (arguing that the bishops’ enthusiasm may have
resulted from a support for limited monarchy rather than self-interest).
14
CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 1050–52.
15
See Carpenter, supra note 2, at 197 (“The liberty of elections meant that bishops should
henceforth be chosen, without royal interference, by the cathedral monks or clergy, while
abbots would be elected by their monks.”).
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electors that were supposedly established in the Charter.16 And as for other canonical
liberties that might have been included within its guarantees, Clause 1 suffered from
the “deplorably vague” character of its words.17 What did it actually guarantee beyond free elections? Opinions differed, and when later test cases came along—the
Statute of Mortmain18 or the Statutes of Provisors19 and Praemunire,20 for example—the complaints of the clergy were disregarded. Because of the uncertainty of
the exact meaning of Clause 1’s words, these anti-clerical statutes could be said to
lie outside the scope of the liberties guaranteed in Magna Carta.21 The new issues
were simply not covered by the Clause’s terms.
Despite these disappointments, the clergy did not cease to cite the Charter as a
means of stating their own grievances. They did so loudly and repeatedly.22 The
results, however, remained negligible. Only long established legal institutions like
benefit of clergy in criminal cases survived.23 Freedom from taxation by the Crown
did not.24 It is of course a mistake to paint the English bishops as helpless victims
of royal aggression during the later Middle Ages. They won some battles.25 But
Magna Carta’s first clause was not what made the difference.
The second point—the clergy’s continuing support for reiteration and enforcement of the Charter’s provisions—is also well established. C. R. Cheney summed
it up. Continuing clerical reaffirmations of its terms, he wrote, showed that by the
1290s, “Magna Carta had come to stay, and the English hierarchy was committed
to safeguarding it.”26 Archbishop Pecham’s Council of Oxford (1279) ordered that
16

See generally WALDO E.L. SMITH, EPISCOPAL APPOINTMENTS AND PATRONAGE IN THE
REIGN OF EDWARD II: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE (1938) (providing
a lengthy account of royal and papal influence over episcopal elections).
17
MCKECHNIE, supra note 10, at 192.
18
7 Edw. I, 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 51 (1235–1377).
19
25 Edw. III, 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 253 (1235–1377).
20
16 Ric. II, c. 5, 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 84 (1377–1504).
21
See FAITH THOMPSON, THE FIRST CENTURY OF MAGNA CARTA: WHY IT PERSISTED AS
A DOCUMENT 71 (1925); THOMPSON, MAGNA CARTA, supra note 6, at 122–23 (1948);
Philippa M. Hoskin, Introduction to ENGLISH EPISCOPAL ACTA 38, LONDON 1229–1280, at
xlviii–xlix (Philippa M. Hoskin ed., 2011).
22
See generally W.R. Jones, Bishops, Politics, and the Two Laws: The Gravamina of the
English Clergy, 1237–1399, 41 SPECULUM 209 (1966) (providing an overview of the clergy’s
use of the Charter to assert jurisdiction).
23
See Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 514–21
(2002).
24
David A. Carpenter, Magna Carta 1253: The Ambitions of the Church and the
Divisions Within the Realm, 86 HIST. RES. 179, 180–82 (2012) (stating that Henry III levied
an ecclesiastical tax to fund the crusades in 1253).
25
See, e.g., id. at 181.
26
C. R. CHENEY, The Church and Magna Carta, 68 THEOLOGY 266, 272 (1965), reprinted
in C. R. CHENEY, at THE PAPACY AND ENGLAND 12TH–14TH CENTURIES, XV; see also CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 446–60 (discussing the enforcement and triumph of Magna Carta).
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it be posted in cathedral and collegiate churches,27 and it came to be the practice that
each year for English bishops to issue a formal decree declaring to excommunicate
any person who violated the provisions of Magna Carta.28 According to some accounts, the Charter’s provisions were read out publicly twice yearly in all cathedral
churches.29 They were included in episcopal registers.30 The terms of Magna Carta
were also included in instructional manuals used by the parochial clergy to educate
and guide the laity.31 Probably this would have been the most immediate way the
laity became familiar with its terms. We know that these things were done in fact.32
We may wonder at the clergy’s enthusiasm for the Charter in light of the apparently
meager results of the guarantee of clerical liberties found in Clause 1, but that this
renewed and apparently strong support for it existed in 1215 and that it continued
after the thirteenth century, there can be little doubt.33 Too much evidence of long
lasting clerical support for the Great Charter’s terms exists for that to be denied. Not
all historians of Magna Carta have dealt with the church’s place in the story, but
those who have raised and discussed the question at all have established the existence
of clerical support that continued long after 1215.
27

COUNCILS & SYNODS WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ENGLISH CHURCH
II A.D. 1205–1313, at 851 (F. M. Powicke & C. R. Cheney eds., 1964) [hereinafter COUNCILS & SYNODS].
28
See, e.g., Acta 83, Bishop Fulk Basset of London (May 1253), in ENGLISH EPISCOPAL
ACTA 38: LONDON 1229–1280, at 61–62 (Philippa Hoskin ed., 2011); Sentence of Excommunication (1254), in 1 CONCILIA MAGNAE BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE, 703–04 (David
Wilkins ed., London, 1737); Sentence of Excommunication (1298), in 2 CONCILIA MAGNA
BRITANNIAE ET HIBERNIAE, 240–42 (David Wilkins ed., London, 1737). For fuller details,
see Margaret McGlynn, From Charter to Common Law: The Rights and Liberties of the PreReformation Church, in MAGNA CARTA, RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 53, 56 (Robin
Griffith-Jones & Mark Hill eds., 2015).
29
See Sentence of Excommunication (1298), supra note 28, at 240. Many bishops’
records show that this was done in fact, see, e.g., Acta 94, Bishop Walter de Cantilupe of
Worcester (May 1253) in ENGLISH EPISCOPAL ACTA 13: WORCESTER 1218–1268, at 79
(Philippa Hoskin ed., 1997). A compilation of the evidence on this point appears in Acta 45,
Cormeilles abbey (May 1247), in ENGLISH EPISCOPAL ACTA 35: HEREFORD 1234–1275, at
48–49 (Julia Barrow ed., 2009).
30
See, e.g., Order of Protection for Hugh le Despenser (Dec. 15, 1321), in 3 REGISTERS OF
ROGER MARTIVAL, BISHOP OF SALISBURY 1315–1330, at 87 n.320 (Susan Reynolds ed., 1965).
31
John de Burgh, Pupilla oculi, pt. V, c. 22 (“De sentencia lata super magnam cartam
et super cartam de foresta Anglie”); see also W. A. PANTIN, THE ENGLISH CHURCH IN THE
FOURTEENTH CENTURY 198 n.1 (1st ed. 1962) (treating William of Pagula’s Oculus sacerdotis);
KEITH WALLS, JOHN BROMYARD ON CHURCH AND STATE: THE SUMMA PREDICANTIUM AND
EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 16 (2007).
32
See PANTIN, supra note 31, at 198 (“It is interesting to see how every parishioner was
kept, or supposed to be kept, conscious of Magna Carta . . . .”).
33
See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 420–23; J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 327–28 (3d ed.
2015).
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I. THE CLERGY’S INTEREST IN MAGNA CARTA
The enthusiasm for the Great Charter long shown by the English clergy invites
a further look at the practical effect of those of its provisions that involved them.
Scholars have sometimes ignored this subject, concluding that the repeated proclamation of Magna Carta’s provisions by the English bishops “remained what it had
always been: nothing more than a pious gesture.”34 But this leaves a question. Why
should they have been so enthusiastic for so long about a document that brought
them so little actual advantage? The combined forces of hope, custom, and provincial legislation may of course explain part of this long-lasting enthusiasm, but surely
not all. At some point, reality ought to have set in. In fact, this Article contends,
invocation by the English clergy of Magna Carta was more than a fruitless gesture.
The Great Charter served the practical interests of the English church in two immediate ways, and both of them went beyond the terms of Clause I.
II. THE CLERGY AS BENEFICIARIES OF THE CHARTER’S CLAUSES
The first consequence of Magna Carta of special interest to the church carries
us beyond the famous Clause I. Several other clauses in Magna Carta safeguarded
specific material interests of church and clergy.35 These Clauses favoring clerical
interests have drawn less notice among historians. They were admittedly less dramatic.
However, they were more specific. They would have encouraged continuing clerical
support for the 1215 Charter, and most of them were repeated in subsequent confirmations.36 Clause 14, for example, promised that the church’s prelates would be
summoned to take part in future assessments of taxation imposed on the realm,
stating also that they would be given sufficient lead time to arrange their affairs and
thus make their attendance possible.37 Clause 22 [14] limited the power of the Crown
to levy amercements—what we would call monetary fines—against the clergy.38 It
also restricted the amount of clerical amercements by eliminating ecclesiastical benefices from the process of calculating how large they would be.39 Clause 55 guaranteed
34

J.W. Gray, The Church and Magna Carta in the Century After Runnymede, in 6
HISTORICAL STUDIES: PAPERS READ BEFORE THE IRISH CONFERENCE OF HISTORIANS 23, 35
(T.W. Moody ed., 1968).
35
MAGNA CARTA (1215) cls. 14, 22, 42, 46, 63, at 137–38.
36
See COUNCILS & SYNODS, supra note 27, at 137–38; Charles Donahue, Jr., The Whole
of the Constitutional History of England is a Commentary on this Charter, 94 N.C. L. REV.
1521, 1528–29 (2016).
37
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 14.
38
Id. at c. 22. Throughout this Article, reference has been made to the clause numbers
in the 1215 version when referring to the Charter; where they existed the numbers used in
the later statutory version (1225) have been given in square brackets following the original
clause number.
39
Id.
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that the archbishop of Canterbury would have the right to participate in the decisions
taken by the twenty-five barons in charge of securing royal obedience to the charter—
the notorious Security Clause.40 Clause 60 [37] recognized that the clergy had their
own “rights and liberties” under English customary law, and it promised that they
would be respected in future practice.41 Clause 63, the final part in the document,
repeated Clause 1’s recognition of the English church’s freedom, here going on to
promise that it would be observed “well and peacefully, freely and quietly, [and] fully
and completely” in the future.42
Moreover, many of the good practices endorsed by the Charter covered both
clerical rights and baronial rights. The clergy were, in particular, clearly among the
“free men” so frequently mentioned as recipients of respect and rights in the document.43 These rights were mentioned specifically in Clauses 14, 15 [10], 20 [14], 22
[14], and 39 [29],44 and although it is true that the clergy were not their sole beneficiaries, the clerical order stood to gain by enforcement of all these clauses. They
were among the “free men” whose protection these clauses endorsed. Their rights
were also among the good customs of the realm spoken of throughout the document.45
With some reason, the clergy as a body believed that their own interests would be
protected by enforcement of the Charter’s terms. Even those which were limited to
“free men” brought a modicum of protection to them.
The clergy also benefitted in indirect ways from enforcement of Magna Carta’s
terms. Their personal gain may have been secondary to the recognition of the influence of the substance of the Church’s law, but it would have enlisted the continuing
support of influential English clergy nonetheless. A survey of the contents of the
clauses from which they benefitted shows why the clergy might have supported its
continued importance.46 Clause 8 [7], stating that widows should not be compelled
to marry, saving the feudal lord’s right to consent to a marriage if widows did wish
to remarry, contains a statement of the principle of freedom in marital choice.47 It
was a principle of the canon law at the time, and really only of the canon law.48 Its
40

Id. at c. 55.
Id. at c. 60.
42
Id. at c. 63.
43
See generally MCKECHNIE, supra note 10, 114–20 (discussing the ambiguous definition of “freemen” in Magna Carta).
44
MAGNA CARTA (1215) cls. 14, 15, 20, 22, 39.
45
See, e.g., id. at c. 13 (declaring London to have “ancient liberties and free customs”);
id. at c. 60 (preserving customs and liberties of English law).
46
A further possibility of indirect ecclesiastical influence is the use of a forty-day waiting
period before legal consequences followed an act, a period that recurred in clauses 7, 14, 48, and
61 in Magna Carta. Id. at cls. 7, 14, 48, 61. It was used in various aspects of contemporary
ecclesiastical legislation and practice. See F. DONALD LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE
SECULAR ARM IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 73–74 (1968).
47
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 8.
48
See generally Charles J. Reid, Jr., “So It Will Be Found That the Right of Women in
Many Cases Is of Diminished Condition”: Rights and the Legal Equality of Men and Women
41

2016]

THE CHURCH AND MAGNA CARTA

431

impact in practice was less than the church desired, and it was limited in this clause
to protection of the widow’s right not to remarry—one of the several examples of
compromise between the interests of the church and those of feudal lords found in
Magna Carta.49 That evident compromise being admitted, the clause is best explained
by ecclesiastical influence. If the Charter had really been animated simply by baronial
self-interest, would this clause have been added? That seems very unlikely.
Clause 27, one that turned out to have lasting consequences in the history of our
law, stated that if a man died intestate his chattels were to pass to “his nearest relations and friends, under the supervision of the church.”50 Behind this clause lay a real
problem. Dying without having made provisions for succession to a man’s personal
property had unleashed what McKechnie accurately described as a “scramble that
often took place for an intestate’s chattels.”51 Feudal lords, family members, creditors with claims against the dead man, and even some adventurers did the scrambling.52 This clause attempted to secure a more orderly and principled disposition of
the assets of the estate, and it did so by submitting administration to the supervision of
the church.53 The justification for what might be described as a “power-grab” was pretty
thin under the canon law of the time, though it did exist.54 However, in the course of
time this seemingly limited power of supervision turned into the probate jurisdiction
that was held by the English church until the mid-nineteenth century.55 It was the church
that administered the law of succession to personal property, and the scope of ecclesiastical administration took a boost from this clause in the Great Charter.56
Clause 42 provides another instance.57 It safeguarded the right of any person
(unicuique) to leave the realm and return except in time of war and, of course, except
for criminals.58 This had been an urgent and controversial matter during the reign of
Henry II. The issue was then raised in the context of appeals to the papal court in Rome.
The Constitutions of Clarendon (1164), which purported to state the traditional
customs and privileges of the English kings, contained a statement that “it was not
lawful for archbishops, bishops and beneficed clergy to depart from the kingdom

in Twelfth and Thirteenth-Century Canon Law, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 471, 491–98 (2002).
49
Helmholz, supra note 1, at 317.
50
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 27.
51
MCKECHNIE, supra note 10, at 327.
52
See id. at 328.
53
Id. at 329.
54
Id. at 327 (stating justification was “to secure the deceased’s kinsmen and friends the
right to make an equitable division of his chattels”).
55
1 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 625–30 (7th ed. 1956).
56
The process by which the church gained control of this jurisdiction is traced as far as
possible in MICHAEL M. SHEEHAN, THE WILL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: FROM THE CONVERSION
OF THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 196–211 (1963).
57
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 42.
58
Id.
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without the lord king’s leave.”59 Its evident purpose was to restrict papal jurisdiction
over disputes that arose in England.60 This was one of the several issues that had
divided Henry from his archbishop, Thomas Becket, and it was not forgotten.61 The
clergy had a long memory. In 1215, they did not want this restriction to freedom of
movement to appear again, and they meant Clause 42 to make sure that it did not.62
Clause 55, which dealt with the difficult problem of the twenty-five barons
assigned to oversee the king’s obedience to Magna Carta’s terms, contains a term
to ensure that the church would have some say in the process.63 Its main point was
to allow this baronial council to remit or reduce illegal fines and amercements
imposed by the king, but it added that the archbishop was to take part in the process
if he desired.64 This was probably meant to temper the harshness of this most controversial part of the Charter, for amercement by the baronial council took out of the
king’s hands something that had been a traditional royal prerogative.65 Offenders
against the law were said to be in misericordia domini regis—in the mercy of the
lord king—and here the Charter empowered the baronial council to upset that
principle.66 The barons must have realized this, and in Clause 55, they sought to take
a little of the sting out of their effort by adding an ecclesiastical voice to the process.
III. VIOLATION OF ECCLESIASTICAL LIBERTIES
The second sort of consequence of the Great Charter’s existence that worked in
the clergy’s favor was that it was employed in practice to create a disciplinary action
or causa ex officio in the ecclesiastical courts. This cause of action served widely to
protect clerical interests. It was used frequently enough to have been given a specific
name in the court records: the causa violationis ecclesiasticae libertatis,67 as if it
were the ecclesiastical counterpart of a common law writ designed to protect the
freedom of the church. Although its source in Magna Carta was noted in episcopal
registers,68 and also in the works of English ecclesiastical lawyers—as by William
59

CONSTITUTIONS OF CLARENDON ch. IV (1165), reprinted in WILLIAM STUBBS, SELECT
CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY FROM THE
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 165 (H. W. C. Davis ed., 9th ed. 1913).
60
FRANK BARLOW, THOMAS BECKET 101 (1986) (noting that travel restrictions limited
judicial appeals to Rome).
61
See generally id. at 107–16.
62
See CARPENTER, supra note 8, at 351–52.
63
MAGNA CARTA (1215) c. 55.
64
Id.
65
HOLT, supra note 33, at 38.
66
See, e.g., CONSTITUTIONS OF CLARENDON ch. X (1165), reprinted in STUBBS, supra
note 59, at 166.
67
See, e.g., Wise C. Ashton (Lichfield 1464), Joint Record Office, Lichfield, Act book
B/C/1/1, fol. 7v.
68
See, e.g., Register for Diocese of Carlisle, (2nd half of fourteenth century), Cumbria
R.O, MS DRC 1/2, p. 393 (stating the remedy available against those who impeded
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of Pagula in the fourteenth century69 and William Lyndwood in the fifteenth70—little
if any notice has been taken of this remedy by most legal historians who have examined the Charter’s later history.71 At least some account of its existence should
be taken, if only as a help in explaining clerical enthusiasm for Magna Carta in the
later Middle Ages.
The ecclesiastical remedy in fact served several purposes. The act books of the
ecclesiastical courts turn up quite varied examples of the ways it was used in practice. If the surviving records give a fair sample of the reality, many and perhaps
most of the cases brought before them were begun to recover dues or other customary payments allegedly owed to the clergy—the mortuary fee, for example, the payment
in goods or money that was due at every person’s death.72 Admittedly it requires a
stretch of the imagination to suppose it had been the barons’ intention at Runnymede
to define the church’s liberties as applying principally to clerical claims to small
sums of money to be collected from the laity, but their words were often so interpreted in ecclesiastical court practice.73
The reach of Magna Carta’s guarantee of ecclesiastical liberty was not, however,
fully confined to securing collection of these monetary claims. The remedy was
sometimes used more widely; for example, to seek redress from those who had
invoked the aid of secular courts to prevent what the clergy considered the rightful
exercise of canonical jurisdiction.74 It was invoked against defendants who, it was
alleged, had “extracted” a man who had taken sanctuary within a parish church, thus
ecclesiastical jurisdiction, thus violating the “liberates tam regni quam ecclesie concessas
per cartam domini regis tam de foresta quam de regni libertatibus”).
69
See L. E. Boyle, The Oculus Sacerdotis and Some Other Works of William of Pagula,
5 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 81, 87 (1955).
70
GULIELMO LYNWOOD, PROVINCIALE (SEU CONSTITUTIONES ANGLIAE) 259, v. ecclesiae
(Oxford 1679).
71
Attention has been focused on the existence of sentences of excommunication. See,
e.g., J. ROBERT WRIGHT, THE CHURCH AND THE ENGLISH CROWN 1305–1334, at 199–202
(1980). A second possible exception is ROBERT RODES, JR., ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION
IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE REFORMATION 129, 132 (1977).
72
Fuller treatment of this controversial subject is found in R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE IUS
COMMUNE IN ENGLAND: FOUR STUDIES 135–86 (2001).
73
One should distinguish these cases from ex officio prosecutions begun to protect
geographical liberties. See, e.g., Ex officio c. Wady (York, 1467), in ACTS OF CHAPTER OF
THE COLLEGIATE CHURCH OF SS. PETER AND WILFRID, RIPON, A.D. 1452 TO A.D. 1506, at
129 (J. T. Fowler ed., 1875).
74
Ex officio c. Heyround (Canterbury, 1305), Lambeth Palace Library MS 244, fol. 42v
(invoking royal jurisdiction in a plea that “iuxta libertatem ecclesie” had begun properly before
the court of the bishop elect of Lincoln); see also Ex officio c. Bonn (Canterbury, 1469),
Canterbury Cathedral Archives, Act book Y.1.11, fol. 40 (“violavit ecclesiasticam libertatem
in arrestando Johannem Symond venientem ad curiam consistorii Cantuariensis”); Ex officio
c. Randall (Norwich, 1509), Norfolk RO, ACT/1, fol. 11 (for causing arrest of witnesses in
ecclesiastical court and thus breaching “libertas ecclesiastica”).
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acting contrary to the liberties of the church.75 It was applied against a man who had
cut down some trees on property allegedly attached to a prebend in the cathedral
church of York.76 It was called upon to discipline a London man who had allegedly
slandered the clergy by saying they kept “as evil a rule and worse” than all other
orders of men.77 It was even used to remedy a wrongful entry of a stranger into a
house within what appears to have been within the cathedral close.78 In cases like
these, the “deplorably vague” nature of the language in Magna Carta’s first Clause
actually turned out to be an advantage for the clergy. If ecclesiastical officers could
define the language in that Clause for themselves, as they normally could within
their own tribunals, they enjoyed a freedom to use it to their own advantage. So
defined, Clause 1 did serve to protect their interests more widely than has been suspected. It protected clerical privileges, some of them controversial and some of them
unpopular with the laity—the kind of protection every bishop could endorse.
However, there were limits. Magna Carta did not provide the church with an allpurpose remedy. It was not used to reach all kinds of speech or action that seemed to
threaten the medieval church’s interests. Prosecutions for heresy, blasphemy, and
sacrilege,79 for example, were brought in fact, and they appeared in court books, but
not under the rubric of violation of ecclesiastical liberty.80 Nor was Magna Carta invoked in routine prosecutions for interference or contempt of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.81 Perhaps more surprisingly, disciplinary actions for assaulting a cleric were
75

Ex officio c. Smyth (York, 1519), Borthwick Institute, York, Act book D/C.AB.2, fol.
226v (said to be “libertatem ecclesiasticam in hac parte violando, sententiam excommunicationis maioris in ea parte incurrendo”); see also Ex officio c. Vaughan (London, 1497), in
A SERIES OF PRECEDENTS IN CRIMINAL CAUSES, 1475–1640, no. 170 (William Hale ed.,
1847, reissued 1973). Another example is Ex officio c. Archer et al. (Canterbury, 1308),
Lambeth Palace Library MS 244, fol. 93v.
76
Ex officio c. Baxby (York, 1323), Borthwick Institute, York, Cause papers CP.F.135. The
judge stated that he intended to proceed “in presente negotio pretense violacionis ecclesiastice
libertatis ex mero officiio suo.” Id. This was probably an effort to avoid a writ of prohibition
for invoking ecclesiastical jurisdiction in a case involving real property.
77
Ex officio c. Ashford (London, 1494), London Metropolitan Archives, Act book 9064/6,
fol. 38.
78
Ex officio c. Knight (York, 1397), Borthwick Institute, Act book D/C.AB.1, fols. 4,
9 (“[S]ententiam excommunicationis contra omnes violatores ecclesiastice liberatis notorie
incurrendo.”); see also Ex officio c. Ancel et al. (Rochester, 1348), in REGISTRUM HAMONIS
HETHE, DIOCESIS ROFFENSIS, A.D. 1319–1352, at 1025 (C. Johnson ed., 1948).
79
See, e.g., Ex officio c. Feynt (Canterbury, 1399), Canterbury Cathedral Library, Act
book X.8.1, fol. 26v (“notatur quod commisit sacrileium asportando furtive lapides . . . a
cimiterio et ecclesia ibidem”).
80
See, e.g., Ex officio c. Lankiston (London, 1492), London Metropolitan Archives, Act
book 9064/5, f. 29v. Lankiston was cited to answer “certis articulis crimen heresis tangentibus.”
Id. On this subject, see IAN FORREST, THE DETECTION OF HERESY IN LATE MEDIEVAL
ENGLAND 14–19 (2005) (noting that heresy was an act of turning away from the Church and
God, rather than encroaching on its liberty).
81
See, e.g., Ex officio c. Kyte (London, 1522), London Metropolitan Archives, Act book
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not swept within this rubric; instead, they were brought under an enactment of the
Third Lateran Council, called Si quis suadente.82 Actions to recover unpaid tithes
were also brought under a separate heading in the medieval act books; apparently
they were not regarded as infringing upon the freedom of the church.83 They occupied a category of their own.
The extent to which this clerical use of Magna Carta continued after the English
Reformation is unfortunately not a question that can be answered. My impression—
and it is no more than that—is that there were fewer invocations of the Charter in
the diocesan courts than there had during the Middle Ages. The church’s courts were
not moribund during the years before the outbreak of the Civil War in 1640.84 In
fact, in terms of volume of ex officio cases brought before them, they flourished, and
occasional mentions of the Charter’s protection of the church’s liberties are found
in the court records.85 Henry Swinburne, the greatest of the late sixteenth-century
civilians, also cited the Great Charter with the expectation that it would be of service
to the church.86 As is well known, England under the Stuart monarchs witnessed a
revival of interest in Magna Carta’s terms, a revival led by Sir Edward Coke.87 To
all appearances, nothing like that revival took place during these years within the
ecclesiastical forum. Archbishop Laud’s policies seem not to have extended that far.
CONCLUSION
A word in conclusion. In what has just been described, little or nothing has been
said about the possibility that the English bishops supported the continued existence
and enforcement of the terms of Magna Carta for altruistic reasons. This may be too
cynical an approach. The bishops may have wished to promote the cause of good
9065/J/1 (recording that the defendant “notatur officio super contemptu eo quod procuravit
et fecit apparitorem reverendi patris impediri”).
82
See generally R.H. Helmholz, Si quis suadente (C.17 q.4 c.29): Theory and Practice,
in 8 PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF MEDIEVAL CANON LAW
425–38 (Peter Linehan ed., 1988).
83
RODES, supra note 71, at 50–51 (describing the development of the legal doctrine of
tithes from “feudal dues (dominicae) out of land” to “a share of the increase given to God
because God has bestowed it”).
84
See generally R. B. OUTHWAITE, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS,
1500–1860 (2006).
85
See, e.g., Ex officio c. Dicson (Durham, 1593), Durham University Library, Act book
DDR IV/3, fol. 96; see also Clement Colmore’s Book (Durham ca. 1600), Durham University Library, DDR/EJ/CCA/1/7, fol. 245v.
86
See HENRY SWINBURNE, A BRIEF TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS Pt. II,
§ ix, no. 22, at 51 (Garland Publishing 1978) (1590) (citing Magna Carta’s provisions on
wills and testaments).
87
See generally EDWARD COKE, SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND (1642), reprinted in THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD
COKE 746–914 (Steve Shepard ed., 2003).

436

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 25:425

government for the same reasons that motivate any public spirited group today—as
“the right thing to do.” They may have looked beyond their own interests. One
should not deny this possibility. This Article has simply followed the more common
and the safer path. The habitual cynicism of our own century all but mandates this
approach. This may not be right or fair. But of course, it is true that the English clergy
had a propensity to equate good government with the recognition of their order’s
privileges. In that sense, this Article has simply followed their lead.

